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INTRODUCTION 
Two international Tribunals recently examined what level of 
direction and control has to be wielded by a State over military or 
paramilitary groups to make a non-international conflict an international 
one. The general view perceives the holdings of both tribunals to be in 
conflict, this article maintains that they are not. It argues that both 
tribunals were weighing factors, and that every court of first instance 
always has to weigh these factors to decide whether acts of armed 
groups can be attributed to a State. 
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I. RELATION BETWEEN THE NATURE OF THE CONFLICT AND THE 
PROBLEM OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY 
The question whether the conflict is international or not, is closely 
related to the problem of State responsibility, and the question whether 
acts of military or paramilitary groups who oppose the government of 
State A are attributable to State B.1 
If the acts of the military or paramilitary group are attributable to 
State B, for instance, because State B trained, financed and supervised 
the military or paramilitary groups, then on the one hand State B will be 
responsible under general international law for their acts. However, on 
the other hand, the conflict in State A will be considered international 
under the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols because 
foreign State B has intervened in, at the first sight, a non-international 
conflict in State A. 
II. FACTS OF THE NICARAGUA AND THE TADIC CASES 
Two Tribunals have developed a test to determine the international 
character of conflicts and the responsibility of an intervening State in 
cases of military or paramilitary groups. 
First, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) had to decide a case 
of pure State responsibility. 
In 1984, the Republic of Nicaragua charged the United States with 
violations of customary and treaty law by its involvement in military 
and paramilitary activities against Nicaragua. Nicaragua accused the 
United States of attacks on oil pipelines, storage and port facilities, as 
well as Nicaraguan naval patrol boats. Further complaints pertained to 
the mining of Nicaraguan ports, violations of Nicaraguan air space, and 
the training, arming, equipping, financing and supplying of counter-
revolutionary forces (known as contras) seeking to overthrow the 
government of Nicaragua.2 Nicaragua also claimed that the United 
States was responsible for violations of international humanitarian law 
1. Contra Commentary on the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for 
International Wrongful Acts, Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its 
Fifty-Third Session, 53 U.N. GAOR Supp. 10, U.N. Doc. N56/10 (2001), pp. 106-07, art. 8, 
Comm. 5, available at 
http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/State _responsibility/responsibility_ commentaries( e ).pdf#pa 
gemode=bookmarks (last visited Feb. 10, 2005). The commentaries explain that the two 
legal issues can be different and that "[t]he [ICTY]'s mandate is directed to issues of 
individual criminal responsibility, not State responsibility, and the question in [the Tadic] 
case concerned not responsibility but the applicable rules of international humanitarian 
law." Id. 
2. LORI FISLERDAMROSCH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW 955 (2001). 
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committed by the contras. 
To decide whether the United States was responsible, the ICJ had 
to decide whether the acts of (1) individual mercenaries hired by the 
CIA and of (2) the contras were attributable to the United States. 
Second, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) faced the same problem from a slightly different 
perspective. 3 
The ICTY was established in 19934 to prosecute persons 
responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law 
committed in the territory of the Former Yugoslavia.5 
The ICTY has jurisdiction (or "competence") under its Statute to 
prosecute persons who committed or who ordered to be committed 
grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 6 who violated the laws 
or customs of war,7 who committed genocide, 8 or who committed 
crimes against humanity.9 
The ICTY held that the international or non-international character 
of the armed conflict is not relevant for its jurisdiction over violations of 
the laws or customs of war under Article 3 of the ICTY Statute. 10 
Neither is the character of the armed conflict relevant for the 
3. Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for 
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the 
Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th Mtg., art. 5, 
U.N. Doc. S/RES/827, 32 l.L.M. 1192 (1993), amended by S.C. Res. 1166 of May 13, 1998; 
S.C. Res. 1329 ofNov. 30, 2000; S.C. Res. 1411 of Mai 17, 2002, S.C. Res. 1431Aug.13, 
2002; S.C. Res. 1481 May 19, 2003, U.N. SCOR, 4759 meeting, S/RES/1481, available at 




6. Id. at art. 2. 
7. Id. at art. 3. 
8. ICTY Statute, 32 1.L.M. 1192, at art. 4. 
9. Id. at art. 5. 
10. The Tadic Jurisdiction Appeals Chamber held that Article 3 of the ICTY Statute 
applies to both international and non-international armed conflicts. Prosecutor v. Tadic, 
Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on 
Jurisdiction, Appeals Judgment, at para. 137 (Oct. 2, 1995) [hereinafter Tadic Appeals 
Judgment]; Prosecutor v. FurundZija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Trial Judgment, para. 132 
(Dec. 10, 1998); Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Trial Judgment, para. 161 
(Mar. 3, 2000); Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23-T&IT-96-23/1-T, Trial Judgment 
para. 402 (Feb. 22, 2001); Prosecutor v. Kordic, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, Trial Judgment, 
para. 163 (Feb. 26, 2001); Prosecutor v. Kvo~ka, Case No. IT-98-30/1-T, Trial Judgment, 
para. 123, (Nov. 2, 2001); Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-T, Trial Judgment, 
para. 51 (Mar. 15, 2002). 
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prosecution of persons who committed genocide11 or crimes against 
humanity. 12 However, the ICTY held that the character of the armed 
conflict is relevant for the jurisdiction of the ICTY over grave breaches 
of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. 13 
Dusko Tadic was the first accused who appeared before the ICTY. 
He was a supporter of the Greater Serbia nationalist cause. During the 
armed conflict in 1992 in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serb forces unlawfully 
confined thousands of Muslims and Croats in the Omarska, Keraterm 
and Tmopolje prison-camps. Tadic participated in the attack, seizure, 
murder and maltreatment of Muslims and Croats both within the three 
camps and outside the camps. He was indicted by the Prosecutor of the 
ICTY and charged with grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, 14 
11. ICTY Statute, 32 l.L.M. 1192, at art. 4 (Article 4 of the ICTY Statute does not 
require that the genocide take place during an international armed conflict). 
12. Id. at art. 5 (Article 5 of the ICTY Statute reads that crimes against humanity are 
within the jurisdiction of the ICTY "when committed in armed conflict, whether 
international or internal in character.") 
13. The argument of the ICTY is that the 1949 Geneva Conventions establishes a 
twofold "grave breaches" system: there is on the one hand an enumeration of offences that 
are regarded so serious as to constitute "grave breaches," and closely bound up with this 
enumeration a mandatory enforcement mechanism was set up, based on the concept of a 
duty and a right of all Contracting States to search for and try or extradite persons allegedly 
responsible for "grave breaches." The ICTY held that the universal jurisdiction is however 
limited to the grave breaches committed in "international" armed conflicts. Tadic 
Jurisdiction Appeals Judgment (Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal 
on Jurisdiction), IT-94-1-AR72, October 2, 1995, para. 79. This "international" armed 
conflict requirement was a necessary limitation in 1949 on the grave breaches system in 
light of the intrusion on State sovereignty that such mandatory universal jurisdiction 
represents. The ICTY argued that State parties to the 1949 Geneva Conventions did not 
want to give other States jurisdiction over serious violations of international humanitarian 
law committed in their domestic armed conflicts-at least not the mandatory universal 
jurisdiction involved in the "grave breaches" system. Id. at para. 80. Thus, to have 
jurisdiction under article 2 of its Statute, the ICTY had to find that the conflict in the Former 
Yugoslavia was international. When the 1949 Geneva Conventions were updated with the 
two Additional Protocols in 1977, the drafters quite explicitly excluded any suggestion that 
there could be "grave breaches" during a non-international armed conflict. WILLIAM A. 
SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 42 (Cambridge 
University Press, 2001 ). However, Judge Abi-Saab stated in his Separate Opinion in the 
Tadic Jurisdiction Appeals case that "a strong case can be made for the application of 
Article 2, even when the incriminated act takes place in an internal conflict." (Separate 
Opinion of Judge Abi-Saab, Tadic, IT-94-1-AR72, Jurisdiction Appeals Judgment, at para. 5 
(Oct. 2, 1995)); see also CelebiCi, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Trial Judgment, at para. 202 (Nov. 
16, 1998); and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Rodrigues, Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-T, 
Trial Judgment, at para. 44 (June 25, 1999). Christine Byron, Armed Conflicts: International 
or Non-International, 6 J. OF CONFLICT AND SEC. LAW 63, 66, n. 18 (2001); see also ICTY 
Statute, 32 l.L.M. 1192, at art. 2. 
14. ICTY Statute, 321.L.M. 1192, at art. 2. 
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violations of the laws or customs of war, 15 and crimes against 
humanity. 16 
Tadic first contested the legitimacy of the creation and the subject 
matter jurisdiction of the ICTY. The ICTY refuted his arguments in the 
Tadic Jurisdiction Trial Judgment, 17 and again on appeal in the Tadic 
Jurisdiction Appeals Judgment. 18 On the merits, the Tadic Trial 
Chamber19 found the defendant guilty on most of the counts. The Tadic 
Appeals Chamber partially reversed the legal reasoning of the Trial 
Chamber.20 
In the four Judgments in the Tadic case, the ICTY interpreted its 
Statute and developed the fundamental principles on which its entire 
jurisprudence afterwards was based. One of the fundamental problems 
faced by the ICTY was whether the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina was 
international because of the military assistance received by the Bosnian 
Serb Army from the Army of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. 
Both the ICJ and the ICTY had to determine the nature and 
closeness of the relationship between the military or paramilitary groups 
and the intervening State for liability purposes. The traditional view, as 
presented by the ICTY, is that the tests of both Tribunals are in conflict. 
However, at a closer look, this conflict appears to be exaggerated or 
even non-existent. 
III. GENERAL TEST TO DETERMINE THE INTERNATIONAL CHARACTER OF 
AN ARMED CONFLICT IN TADIC 
The traditional view, which perceives the holdings of Nicaragua 
and Tadic to be in conflict, is generated by the way the Tadic Appeals 
Chamber read the Nicaragua case. 21 
The Tadic Appeals Chamber articulated, first, a more general legal 
15. ICTY Statute, 32 l.L.M. 1192, at art. 3. 
16. Id. at art. 5. 
17. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Jurisdiction Trial Judgment (Aug. 10, 
1995). 
18. Tadic Appeal, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Jurisdiction Appeals Judgment (Oct. 2, 
1995). 
19. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Trial Judgment (May 7, 1997). 
20. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Judgment (July 15, 1999); and the 
Corrigendum to Judgment of the Appeals Chamber of July 15, 1999 (19 Nov. 1999). 
21. The Tadic Jurisdiction Appeals Chamber did not resolve the issue whether the 
armed conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina was international or not, implicitly leaving the 
decision and the test to be elaborated to the Chambers who would hear the merits of the 
case. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Jurisdiction Appeals Judgment, at para. 77 (Oct. 2, 
1995). Contra id. at paras. 17-20 (Separate Opinion of Judge Li on the Defense Motion for 
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction); see also Byron, supra note 8, at 67. 
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test to determine the character of an armed conflict. 
It is indisputable that an armed conflict is international 
if it takes place between two or more States. In addition, in 
cases of an internal armed conflict breaking out on the 
territory of a State, it may become international (or, 
depending upon the circumstances, be international in 
character alongside an internal armed conflict) if 
(i) another State intervenes in that conflict through its 
troops, or alternatively if 
(ii) some of the participants in the internal armed 
conflict act on behalf of that other State. 22 
The first hypothesis, the intervention of another State, can be 
proven factually. Analyzing the second hypothesis, however, is more 
complex.23 
IV. INTERPRETATION OF THE HOLDING OF NICARAGUA BY THE TADIC 
APPEALS CHAMBER 
To determine whether "some of the participants in the internal 
armed conflict act on behalf of' another State, the Tadic A~peals 
Chamber drew guidance from the Nicaragua Judgment of the ICJ. 
The Tadic Appeals Chamber read the Nicaragua Judgment to 
mean that the ICJ made a distinction between the acts of three 
individuals or groups of individuals. 
According to the ICTY, the ICJ first established that acts were 
imputable to the United States if the individuals concerned were 
officials of the United States (for instance high-altitude reconnaissance 
flights by U.S. airplanes).25 
Second, the ICJ discussed whether individuals, not having the 
status of United States officials, but allegedly paid by and acting unde.r 
22. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Judgment, at para. 84 (July 15, 1999) followed 
by Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Trial Judgment, at para. 75 (Mar. 3, 2000); Kordic, Case 
No. IT-95-14/20-T, Trial Judgment, at para. 66 (Feb. 26, 2001). 
23. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Trial Judgment, at para. 76 (Mar. 3, 2000). 
24. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Judgment, at para. 99 (July 15, 1999). 
25. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 
I.CJ. 14 (June 27), 52-53, para. 91 [hereinafter Nicaragua]; see also the dissenting opinions 
on the principle of State responsibility and the "effective control test." Id. at 181, 185-190, 
paras. 11, 14-19; (separate opinion of Judge Ago). Id. at 259, 388 para. 257 of Part IV; "The 
Law," Chapter U "Responsibility for Violations of the Law of War" (dissenting opinion of 
Judge Schwebel); Id. at 528, 537-538 (dissenting opinion of Judge Sir Robert Jennings). 
6
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 32, No. 2 [2005], Art. 4
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol32/iss2/4
2005] The International Character of an Armed Conflict 27 5 
the instructions of United States organs, could legally involve the 
responsibility of the United States. 
These individuals in the Nicaragua case were nationals of 
unidentified Latin American countries, referred to in the vocabulary of 
the CIA as UCLA's (Unilaterally Controlled Latino Assets). The 
UCLA's carried out specific tasks such as the mining of Nicaraguan 
ports or waters in early 1984, and attacks on Nicaraguan port and oil 
installations in late 1983 and early 1984.26 
According to the ICTY, the ICJ developed, in the Nicaragua case, 
the "effective control" test; holding that the acts of the UCLA's are 
imputable to the United States in two ways, either on account of the fact 
that, in addition to being paid by United States agents or officials, they 
had been given specific instructions by these agents or officials and had 
acted under their supervision and with their logistic support,27 or 
because "agents of the United States had participated in the planning, 
direction, support and execution of the operations."28 
The ICJ found that the "effective control" test was met for the 
UCLA's, and that the attacks by the UCLA's, if proven, were imputable 
to the United States. 
Finally, the ICJ moved to ascertain whether the responsibility of 
the United States could arise when it supported military or paramilitary 
groups (the contras) in Nicaragua. 
The ICTY interpreted the Nicaragua judgment to mean that the 
ICJ applied the same "effective control" test of the UCLA's to the 
contras. 29 In the view of the ICTY, the ICJ required that the contras not 
only be paid or financed by the United States, and their action be 
coordinated or supervised by the United States, but also that the United 
States should issue specific instructions concerning the commission of 
the acts of the contras in question. 
The ICJ found that the "effective control" test was not met as far as 
the contras were concerned, because despite the heavy subsidies and 
other support provided to them by the United States, there was no clear 
evidence of the United States having actually exercised such a degree of 
26. Nicaragua, 19861.C.J. at 45-46, para. 75. 
27. Id. at 48, para. 80. 
28. Id. at 50-51, para. 86. 
29. "[P]erpetration of the acts contrary to human rights and humanitarian law .... For 
this conduct to give rise to legal responsibility of the United States, it would in principle 
have to be proved that that State had effective control of the military or paramilitary 
operations in the course of which the alleged violations were committed." Id. at 64-65, 
para. 115. 
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control in all fields as to justify treating the contras as acting on its 
behalf.30 
V. TADIC TRIAL CHAMBER FOLLOWS NICARAGUA 
The majority opinion of the Tadic Trial Chamber followed the 
"effective control" test of the ICJ.31 
The Trial Chamber implicitly found that the Bosnian Serb forces 
were not under the effective control of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia after the Yugoslavian army formally withdrew from Bosnia-
Herzegovina, and that therefore the conflict was non-international. For 
that reason, the Trial Chamber found that TadiC' s victims only enjoyed 
the lower level of protection contained in Common Article 3 of the 
Geneva Conventions, and not the protection of the more specific grave 
breaches clause, which is applicable to protected persons in the hands of 
a party during an international armed conflict. 32 
VI. TADIC APPEALS CHAMBER REVERSES 
The majority opinion of the Tadic Appeals Chamber, however, 
reversed. 
The Appeals Chamber departed from the holding of the ICJ with 
regard to military or paramilitary groups, as well as the third group in 
the Nicaragua case, and held that the "effective control" test was 
30. Nicaragua, 1986 1.C.J. at 62 & 139, paras. 109, 277; see also Tadic, Case No. IT-
94-1-A, Appeals Judgment, at paras. 112, 114 (July 15, 1999). 
31. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Trial Judgment, at paras. 584-88 (1997); see also id. 
(McDonald, G., dissenting), at paras. 32-34 (discussing the applicability of article 2 of the 
statute, rejecting the "effective control test" and proposing the "dependence and control" 
test, hereby sewing the seeds of the "overall control" test: "I question why there should be a 
requirement that effective control was in fact exercised when the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia ... was assured that, having transferred officers and enlisted men and provided 
the material, thereby depleting its forces, its plan would be executed . . . . The key issue 
here is whether the VRS [the Army of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina/Republika Srpska] was indeed dependent on and controlled by the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia."). 
32. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Trial Judgment, at paras. 507-08 (1997); see also id. 
(McDonald, G., dissenting), at paras. 5-15 (suggesting that even if the Nicaragua test would 
be the relevant test, the VRS was under the "effective control" of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, which would make the conflict an international one); see also Prosecutor v. 
Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Trial Judgment, at paras. 214, 230 (1998) (taking a different 
approach in the Celebici case, the Trial Chamber found it unnecessary to discuss the 
Nicaragua case, on the basis that the ICJ was a very different body from the ICTY and was 
ruling on issues of State responsibility rather than individual criminal responsibility and 
further finding that the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina was international); see also Byron, 
supra note 8, at 71-72. 
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against the very logic of the entire system of international law on State 
responsibility.33 The Chamber further referred to cases involving the 
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, the European Court of Human 
Rights and State courts, findin~ that international State and judicial 
practice had applied another test. 4 
The Tadic Appeals Chamber held that the extent of requisite State 
control varies. 
According to the Appeals Chamber, the "effective control" test is 
still applicable to the second group in the Nicaragua case-the 
UCLA's. To hold a State responsible for an act of a single private 
individual that is not a State official, it is necessary to ascertain 
"whether specific instructions concerning the commission of that 
particular act had been issued by that State ... ; alternatively, it must be 
established whether the unlawful act had been publicly endorsed or 
approved ex post facto by the State at issue. "35 
But the majority opinion of the Tadic Appeals Chamber rejected 
the "effective control" test for "armed forces or militias or paramilitary 
units," and developed an "overall control" test. The "overall control" 
must comprise "more than the mere provision of financial assistance or 
military equipment or training," but "does not go so far as to include the 
issuing of specific orders by the State, or its direction of each individual 
operation." Therefore, "[ t ]he control . . . may be deemed to exist when a 
State ... has a role in organising, coordinating or planning the military 
actions of the military group, in addition to financing, training and 
equipping or providing operational support to that group."36 
Finally the Tadic Appeals Chamber referred to the Be/sen and 
Menten37 cases, which are two cases of German World War II criminals, 
33. Tadic, IT-94-1-A, Appeals Judgment, at paras. 116-23 (1999); see also id., at para. 
5 (Shahabuddeen, M., dissenting) (finding the Nicaragua test "both right and adequate"). 
34. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Judgment, at paras. 124-25 (July 15, 1999). 
35. Id. at para. 137. 
36. Id. (With Separate Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen, who reserves the position on 
the "overall control test,") followed by Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Trial Judgment, at 
para. 75 (Mar. 3, 2000)(with Separate Declaration of Judge Shahabuddeen, who again 
argues the soundness of the Nicaragua test); Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-A, Appeals 
Judgment, at para. 134 (Mar. 24, 2000); Ce/ebiCi, Case No. IT-96-21-A, Appeals Judgment 
(Feb. 9, 2005); Kordic, IT-95-14/2-T, Trial Judgment, at paras. 111-15 (Feb. 26, 2001). 
37. The Be/sen Case-Trial of Joseph Kramer and 44 Others, British Military Court, 
Luneberg, Sept. 17-Nov. 17, 1945, II Law Reports of Trial of War Criminals, Selected and 
Prepared by the United Nations War Crimes Commission 1 (London: Published for the 
United Nations War Crimes Commission by His Majesty's Stationary Office, 1947) 
[hereinafter Be/sen Case]; Public Prosecutor v. Menten, Hoge Raad (Supreme Court of the 
Netherlands), May 29, 1978, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie, 1978, 1267; 10 NETHERLANDS 
YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 514 (1979); 75 INTERNATIONAL LAW REPORTS 331, 346 
9
Van den hole: Towards A Test Of The International Character Of An Armed Conflic
Published by SURFACE, 2005
278 Syracuse J. Int'l L. & Com. [Vol. 32:269 
establishing the view that international law embraced even another test, 
by which individuals can be assimilated to State organs "on account of 
their actual behaviour within the structure of a State (and regardless of 
any possible requirement of State instructions). "38 
Applying the "overall control" test to the Bosnian Serb Army, the 
majority of the Tadic Appeals Chamber found that Bosnian Serb Forces 
were under the "overall control" of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia.39 Hereby, the ICTY triggered the application of the grave 
breaches provisions of the Geneva Conventions and its own jurisdiction 
under article 2 of the ICTY Statute. 
(1987). 
38. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, at para. 141 (July 15, 1999). The holding of 
the Tadic Appeals Chamber seems to be incorrect with respect to this fourth group of 
individuals. The Appeals Chamber drew guidance from the Be/sen and the Menten cases. 
However, the two cases on which the Appeals Chamber bases its holding deal with 
individual criminal responsibility, and not with State responsibility through acts of 
individuals or armed groups. The defendants in the Be/sen case (also referred to as the 
Kramer case) comprised not only some German staff members of the Belsen and Auschwitz 
concentration camps, but also a number of camp inmates of Polish nationality and an 
Austrian Jew "elevated by the camp administrators to positions of authority over the other 
internees." Be/sen Case, supra note 37. They were inter alia accused of murder and other 
offences against the other camp inmates. The defence argued that no war crime could be 
committed by Poles against other Allied nationals. The Prosecutor however replied that "by 
identifying themselves with the authorities the Polish accused had made themselves as much 
responsible as the S.S. themselves. Perhaps it could be claimed that by the same process 
they could be regarded as having approximated to membership of the armed forces of 
Germany." Id. In the Menten case, Peter Menten, a Dutch national, was found guilty by the 
Dutch courts of having killed, in July 1941 in Poland a number of civilians, mostly Jews, on 
behalf of German Special Forces. Public Prosecutor v. Menten, Hoge Raad (Supreme Court 
of the Netherlands), May 29, 1978; Neder/andse Jurisprudentie, supra note 37. The courts 
applied Article 27 a of the Dutch Decree establishing Extraordinary Penal Provisions (BBS) 
and convicted Menten for crimes against humanity as defined in Article 6(b) and ( c) of the 
Charter of the International Military Court annexed to the London Agreement of August 8, 
1945. Id. However, Article 27 a BBS required that the accused, when the offence was 
committed, was "in military, state or public service of or with the enemy." Id. Menten was 
assigned to the German Special Forces as interpreter, but was formally not a member of 
these Special Forces. Id. The Court found that it "was justified in assuming that his position 
in the Einsatzkommando and his performances in it were of a more or less official character. 
Id. Thus, the relationship to the enemy in which Menten rendered incidental services was of 
such a nature that he could be regarded as a functionary of the enemy," and consequently 
was individually criminally responsible for the crimes under Art. 27 a of the BBS. Id. Both 
the Be/sen and the Menten cases present questions of individuals' criminal responsibility, 
and not of State responsibility. 
39. "Such control manifested itself not only in financial, logistical and other assistance 
and support, but also, and more importantly, in terms of participation in the general 
direction, coordination and supervision of the activities and operations of the [Bosnian Serb 
Forces]. This sort of control is sufficient for the purposes of the legal criteria required by 
international law." Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Jurisdiction Appeals Judgment, at para. 156 
(July 15, 1999). 
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In the way the ICTY read the holding of the Nicaragua case, the 
"overall control" test seems to be in conflict with the "effective control" 
test. However, the Tadic Appeals Chamber mentioned that the holding 
of the Nicaragua case "might at first sight seem somewhat unclear.''4° 
Did the Appeals Chamber misinterpret the Nicaragua case? 
VII. "DIRECTION AND CONTROL" TEST, AND THE WEIGHING OF THE 
FACTORS 
The perceived conflict between the "effective control" test and 
"overall control" test is exaggerated or even does not exist. Both tests 
are manifestations of a more general test of "direction and control,''41 as 
elaborated by the International Law Commission (ICL) in its Draft 
Articles on State Responsibility. 
The Nicaragua and the Tadic judgments distinguished between 
three categories and groups. 
The first category are individuals who enjoy the status of organs 
under the national law of that State (in the Nicaragua case: high-altitude 
reconnaissance flights by U.S. pilots), or who at least belong to public 
entities empowered within the domestic legal system of the State to 
exercise certain elements of governmental authority. Both the ICTY and 
the ICJ agree that there can be no doubt that a State incurs responsibility 
for their acts.42 
This view is correct and consistent with article 4 of the August 
2001 ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility.43 
For the second and third categories (in the Nicaragua case, the 
UCLA's and the contras), the question is what degree of authority or 
control must be wielded by a foreign State over armed individuals or 
forces fighting on its behalf in order to define an armed conflict which 
is prima facie internal, as one that is international in character. 
40. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Judgment at para. 114 (July 15, 1999). 
41. See also, Nicaragua, 1986 I.CJ. at 62, para. 109 ("What the [ICJ] has to 
determine . . . is whether or not the relationship of the contras to the United States 
Government was so much one of dependence on the one hand and control on the other that 
it would be right to equate the contras, for legal purposes, with an organ of the United States 
Government ... " (emphasis added)). 
42. Id.; Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Judgment, at para. 109 (Jul. 15 1999). 
43. Report of the International Law Commission, U.N. GAOR, 53d Sess., Supp. No. 
10, at 44, U.N. Doc a/56/10 (2001). Article 4: Conduct of organs of a State "l. The conduct 
of any State organ shall be considered an act of that State under international law, whether 
the organ exercises legislative, executive, judicial or any other functions, whatever position 
it holds in the organization of the State, and whatever its character as an organ of the central 
government or of a territorial unit of the State. 2. An organ includes any person or entity 
which has that status in accordance with the internal law of the State." Id. 
11
Van den hole: Towards A Test Of The International Character Of An Armed Conflic
Published by SURFACE, 2005
280 Syracuse J. Inf'I L. & Com. [Vol. 32:269 
Article 8 of the August 2001 ILC Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility requires that "the person or group of persons ... is in 
fact acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of, 
that State" (emphasis added).44 The ILC, however, provides no guidance 
for what degree of control (e.g., effective or overall) is required. 
The principles of international law concerning the attribution to 
States of acts performed by private individuals or groups are not based 
on rigid and uniform criteria, as already mentioned by the Tadic 
Appeals Chamber. 45 
On a closer reading, it appears that the ICJ was not setting out an 
"effective control" test, but was weighing a number of factors to 
determine the degree of control required to trigger State responsibility. 
The following factors can be crystallized from the Nicaragua and 
Tadic judgments. 
VIII. FACTORS 
A. Direct Interference 
The first and most decisive factor is the direct interference of the 
regular armed forces of a State in another State to support individuals or 
military or paramilitary groups. 
In the Nicaragua case, the ICJ found that there was no direct 
interference to support the UCLA's or the contras because "all United 
States trainers or advisors remain[ed] on the other side of the frontier, or 
in international waters. ''46 
The ICTY on the other hand found direct interference by active 
elements of the Army of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which 
continued to be involved in the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina.47 
B. Financial Assistance 
A second very important factor is the financing of individuals or 
military or paramilitary groups by the intervening State. 
In the Nicaragua case, the ICJ found that the UCLA's were 
44. Report of the International Law Commission, U.N. GAOR, 53d Sess., Supp. No. 
10, U.N. Doc a/56/10. (Article 8: Conduct directed or controlled by a State: "The conduct of 
a person or group of persons shall be considered an act of a State under international law if 
the person or group of persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the direction 
or control of, that State in carrying out the conduct."). 
45. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Judgment, at para. 117 (1999). 
46. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 60, para. 80. 
47. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Judgment, at para. 151 (1999). 
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"persons in the pay" of the United States.48 Concerning the contras, the 
ICJ found that 
[i]nitial activities in 1981 seem to have been financed out of 
the funds available to the CIA for 'covert' actions; ... $19.5 
million was allocated to these activities. Subsequently, ... a 
further $19 million was approved in late 1981 .... The 
budgetary arrangements for funding subsequent operations 
up to the end of 1983 have not been made clear, though a 
press report refers to the United States Congress as having 
approved 'about $20 million' for the fiscal year to 30 
September 1983 .... During the fiscal year 1984 ... $24 
million ... was available to the Central Intelligence 
Agency.49 
The ICJ further found that 
[ f]inance for supporting the military and paramilitary 
activities of the contras was thus available from the budget 
of the United States Government from some time in 1981 
until 30 September 1984; and finance limited to 
'humanitarian assistance' has been available since that date 
from the same source and remains authorized until 30 
September 1986.50 
The ICTY held that the "financing, trammg and equipping or 
providing operational support" of a military or paramilitary group was a 
relevant factor to determine State responsibility and/or the international 
character of an armed conflict. 51 The Tadic Appeals Chamber found that 
there was a "continuing payment of salaries, to Bosnian Serb and non-
Bosnian Serb officers [of the Bosnian Serb Army] alike, by the 
Government of the Federal Republic ofYugoslavia."52 The pay of 
all 1st Krajina Corps officers and presumably of all senior 
Commanders [of the Bosnian Serb Army], as former officers 
48. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 48, para. 80. 
49. Id. at 55, para. 95. 
50. See also id. at 58, paras. 97, 99, 100. 
51. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Judgment, at para. 137. 
52. Id. at para. 150. 
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of the [Army of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia], 
continued to be received from Belgrade ... acknowledging 
that a possible conclusion with regard to individuals, is that 
payment could well 'be equated with control. ' 53 
C. Military Assistance 
A third factor is the military assistance provided by a State to 
individuals or military or paramilitary groups. 
In the Nicaragua case, the ICJ found that the contras received 
arms, ammunition, food, and equipment, including uniforms, boots and 
radio equipment from the CIA. Further, the CIA "supplied the [contras] 
with intelligence, particularly as to Nicaraguan troop movements, 
derived from radio and telephonic interception, code-breaking, and 
surveillance by aircraft and satellites."54 
The Tadic Appeals Chamber found that the forces of the Bosnian 
Serb Army were "almost completely dependent on the supplies of the 
[Army of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] to carry out offensive 
operations. "55 
D. Supervision 
A fourth factor is the degree of supervision by a State over persons 
or military or paramilitary groups. 
The ICJ found, in the Nicaragua case, this factor decisive when it 
required proof that the State issued specific instructions concerning the 
commission of the unlawful acts in question. The ICJ was satisfied that 
these specific instructions existed for the UCLA's. There was sufficient 
evidence that the UCLA's were "persons ... acting on the 
instructions . . . under the supervision and with the logical support of 
United States agents."56 Thus, the UCLA's had attacked according to an 
established pattern. 
A 'mother ship' was supplied ... by the CIA; ... Speedboats, 
guns and ammunition were supplied by the United States 
administration, and the actual attacks were carried out by 
UCLA's .... agents of the United States participated in the 
planning, direction, support and execution of the operations. 
53. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Judgment, at para. 154 (1999). 
54. Nicaragua, 19861.C.J. at 59, para. 101. 
55. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Judgment, at para. 155 (1999). 
56. Nicaragua, 19861.C.J. at 48, para. 80. 
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The execution was the task rather of the UCLA's, while 
United States nationals participated in the planning, direction 
and support. 57 
The ICJ required the same threshold of "effective control" for the 
contras as it did for the UCLA's. Although there was "considerable 
material in press reports of statements by [contra] officials indicating 
participation of CIA advisers in planning and the discussion of strategy 
or tactics, "58 there was no proof that specific instruction had been issued 
by the United States concerning the acts of the contras. Therefore, the 
ICJ found that the United States was not responsible under international 
law for the acts of the contras. 
The Tadic Appeals Chamber also held supervision to be a relevant 
factor. The Appeals Chamber made a distinction between individuals 
not organized into military structures, where "specific instructions or 
directives aimed at the commission of specific acts" had to be given, 
and military or paramilitary groups, where no specific instructions were 
required, but only general coordination or "helping in the general 
planning of its military activity."59 The Appeals Chamber found that 
"the [Army of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] controlled the 
political and military objectives, as well as the military operation, of the 
[Bosnian Serb army]. "60 Officers who were not of Bosnian Serb 
extraction were transferred from their postings in the army of the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to equivalent postings in the Bosnian 
Serb Army. "[T]he [Army of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] 
directed and supervised the activities and operations of [the Bosnian 
Serb Army]. As a result, the [the Bosnian Serb Army] reflected the 
strategies and tactics devised by the [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
and its army]."61 Further, 
[i]t was apparent that ... the Bosnian Serb army continued to 
act in pursuance of the military goals formulated in Belgrade. 
In this regard, clear evidence of a chain of military command 
between Belgrade and [the headquarters of the Bosnian 
Serbs] was presented to the Trial Chamber and the Trial 
Chamber accepted that the [Bosnian Serb Army's] Main 
57. Nicaragua, 19861.C.J. at 50-51, paras. 86. 
58. Id. at 60, para. 104. 
59. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Judgment, at para. 155 (1999) 
60. Id. at para. 150. 
61. Id. at para. 151. 
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Staff had links and regular communications with Belgrade.62 
E. Nationality 
A last factor, although not expressed in the judgments of the ICJ 
and the ICTY, could be the relationship between the intervening State 
and the nationality of the individuals or military or paramilitary groups. 
An international tribunal is, however, not automatically bound by 
the nationality granted by a State on the basis of its domestic laws. 63 
The nationality of persons or members of armed groups should not be 
determined on the basis of formal national characterizations, but rather 
upon an analysis of their substantial relations, taking into consideration 
the different ethnicity of the persons or members of armed groups, and 
their bonds with the foreign intervening State.64 For example, Bosnian 
Serbs who support the Greater Serbia cause are not Bosnians, they are 
Serbs. 
A common nationality between the individuals or the members of 
the armed group and the intervening State can lead to a shared military 
objective. The Tadic Appeals Chamber found that a "distinguishable 
feature of the [Army of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] and the 
[Bosnian Serb Army] was that they possessed shared military 
objectives. As a result, it is inherently unlikely that orders from 
Belgrade circumventing or overriding the authority of local Corps 
commanders [of the Bosnian Serb Army] would have ever been 
62. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Judgment, at para. 152. 
63. See Advisory Opinion No. 4, Nationality Decrees issued in Tunis and Morocco, 
1923 P.C.l.J. 1 (ser. B) No. 4: "it may well happen that, in a matter which, like that of 
nationality, is not, in principle, regulated by international law, the right of a State to use its 
discretion is nevertheless restricted by obligations which it may have undertaken towards 
other States. In such a case, jurisdiction which, in principle, belongs solely to the State, is 
limited by rules of international law." Id at 24; see also Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v. 
Guatemala), 1955 l.C.J. 4 (making a distinction between on the one hand the right of every 
sovereign State, to settle by its own legislation the rules relating to the acquisition of its 
nationality, and on the other hand the international community which determines whether a 
State is entitled to exercise protection and to seize the ICJ). "International practice provides 
many examples of acts performed by States in the exercise of their domestic jurisdiction 
which do not necessarily or automatically have international effect, which are not 
necessarily or automatically binding on other States or which are binding on them only 
subject to certain conditions." Id at 21. "Guatemala is under no obligation to recognize a 
nationality granted in such circumstances." Id at 26; see also Barcelona Traction, Light and 
Power Co., Ltd. (Belgium v. Spain) 1970 l.C.J. 83-84, at paras. 33-34 (separate opinion of 
Judge Fitzmaurice). 
64. Principle stated for the determination of the nationality of the victims under the 
Geneva Conventions. CelebiCi, Case No. IT-96-21-A, Appeals Judgment, at paras. 81, 84 
(Feb. 20, 2001); see also Kordic, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, Trial Judgment, at para. 153 (Feb. 
26, 2001). 
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necessary as these forces were of the same mind'' (emphasis added). 65 
IX. TASK OF EVERY COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE 
This-non exhaustive-list of factors will have to be weighed to 
determine the responsibility of an intervening State for the acts of 
individuals or military or paramilitary groups. 
Undue emphasis upon one factor, as opposed to a balanced 
analysis of the reality of the relationship between that State and 
individuals or military or paramilitary groups, could lead to evasion of 
responsibility. For instance, stressing the ostensible structures and overt 
declarations of a State may tacitly suggest to persons or groups who are 
in de facto control of the State, that responsibility could be evaded 
merely by resort to a superficial restructuring of the groups or by a 
facile declaration that the reconstituted groups are henceforth 
independent of their erstwhile sponsors. 66 
Every court of first instance, as a finder of the facts on the record, 
will have to determine which factors it deems to be relevant, and which 
degree of direct interference, financial or military assistance, 
supervision, and nationality it requires to trigger the responsibility of the 
intervening State, and therefore to change the character of the conflict 
into an international one. 67 
Therefore, there is no contradiction between Nicaragua and Tadic. 
The ICJ, as a court of first instance and a finder of facts on the record, 
could perfectly require a higher level of supervision (or "effective 
control"), after it had established that the contras were an independent 
organization. The contras were found to exist before the United States 
started providing financial assistance, and to have continued their 
operations after the United States had cut off their funds. 68 
The critical language of Nicaragua reads: 
All the forms of United States participation mentioned 
above, and even the general control by the [United States] 
65. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Judgment, at para 153 (July 15, 1999). 
66. Id. at para. 154. 
67. See also contra Commentary on the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for 
International Wrongful Acts, Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its 
Fifty-Third Session, supra note 1, at 59, 107, art. 8, comm. 5. ("In any event it is a matter for 
appreciation in each case whether particular conduct was or was not carried out under the 
control of a State, to such an extent that the conduct controlled should be attributed to it."). 
68. Nicaragua, 19861.C.J. at 21, 53-54, 61, paras. 18, 93-94, 108 ("Even on the face of 
the evidence offered by the Applicant, ... the Court is unable to find that the United States 
created an armed opposition in Nicaragua."). Id. at para. 94. 
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over a force with a high degree of dependence on it, would 
not in themselves mean, without further evidence, that the 
United States directed or enforced the perpetration of the 
acts .... For this conduct [of a force with a high degree of 
dependence on it] to give rise to legal responsibility of the 
United States, it would in principle have to be proved that 
that State had effective control of the military or paramilitary 
operations in the course of which the alleged violations were 
committed (emphasis added). 69 
However, nothing in the Nicaragua case suggests that the same 
threshold of "effective control" has to be applied if the factors of the 
case are different, like in Tadic, where the Bosnian Serb Army was just 
a copy of the Army of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and where 
all the factors point towards the responsibility of the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia. 
CONCLUSION 
A. The Bosnian Genocide Case 
The ICJ will have a second chance to weigh the factors and to 
decide whether a State is responsible under international law for the acts 
of military or paramilitary groups. 70 
The State of Bosnia-Herzegovina brought a case against the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia under the Genocide Convention,71 and 
claims that a number of acts constituting genocide have been committed 
by former members of the Army of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
and by Serb military and paramilitary forces under the direction of, at 
the behest of, and with assistance from the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia. More specifically, the case alleges: 
military and paramilitary activities, including the bombing 
69. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 64-65, para. 115. 
70. In the view of the I.C.J., the Genocide Convention is applicable, without reference 
to the circumstances linked to the domestic or international nature of the conflict. Case 
Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide (Bosnia-Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), 1996 I.C.J. 595, 615, at para. 31(July11, 
1996). 
71. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, G .A. Res. 
260 A (III), Dec. 9, 1948. 
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and shelling of towns and villages, the destruction of houses 
and forced migration of civilians, and of acts of violence, 
including execution, murder, torture, and rape which, in the 
circumstances in which they have occurred, show . . . that 
acts of genocide have been committed ... against the Muslim 
inhabitants of Bosnia-Herzegovina. 72 
Bosnia-Herzegovina claims that the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia is fully responsible under international law for these acts of 
the Bosnian Serbs. 
It would be logical that the ICJ would apply the five non 
exhaustive factors in the same way as the ICTY. The ICJ could then 
find ( 1) that there has been direct interference by the Army of the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina; 
(2) that the Bosnian Serb Army is financed, trained, and equipped by 
Belgrade; (3) that the Army of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
provided military assistance to the Bosnian Serbs; (4) that the Bosnian 
Serb Army is under the supervision of Belgrade, and that a more general 
threshold of "overall control" can be applied in the Genocide case; and 
(5) that the Bosnian Serbs and Mr. Milosivic were of the same 
nationality and of "the same mind." 
Hence, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is to be found 
responsible under international law for the genocide of the Bosnian 
Muslims by the Bosnian Serbs. 
72. Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment 
of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia-Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), 1993 I.C.J. 3, 21, at para. 40 
(Apr. 8, 1993) (Provisional Measures). 
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